Spanish-American War Of
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR OF 1898. For the causes leading up to the war see CUBA and UNITED STATES: History. On the 1Sth of February 1898 the U.S. battleship "Maine," which had been sent to Havana on the 25th of January, was destroyed in Havana harbour by an explosion, with a loss of 266 lives. An American board of inquiry, of which Captain W. T. Sampson was president, made an extensive examination of the wreck, and reported to the navy department on the 21st of March that the explosion was caused by an exterior mine, the principal reason for this decision being the upheaval of the ship's bottom. 1 On the 20th of April President McKinley approved a resolution demanding the withdrawal of Spain from Cuba and setting noon of the 23rd of April as the latest date for a reply to the demand. Before this could be delivered by the American minister in Madrid, the Spanish government sent him his passports. On the 22nd the president declared a blockade of Cuban ports; on the 24th the Spanish government declared war; and on the 1 The Spanish authorities made an examination, but did not inspect the interior, the chief diver reporting that " the bilge and keel of the vessel throughout its entire extent were buried in the mud, but did not appear to have suffered any damage." It has been suggested that the explosion was the work of Cuban sympathizers who thus planned to secure American assistance against Spain. It was not until 1910 that Congress made an appropriation (and an inadequate one then) for raising'the " Maine."
25th the United States Congress declared that war had existed since the 21st.
The American government had begun to prepare for war as early as January: ships on several foreign stations had been drawn nearer home, and those hi Chinese waters were collected at Hong-Kong; the North Atlantic squadron, the only powerful one, had been sent from Hampton Roads into the waters of Florida for manoeuvres; after the destruction of the " Maine " the chief part of the ships in the Atlantic were concentrated at Key West; the battleship " Oregon " was ordered east from the Pacific; ;o,ooo,ooo was voted (March 9) " for the national defence "; steps were taken to purchase auxiliary cruisers, yachts and tugs, which were rapidly equipped; large supplies of ammunition were ordered, and Key West became an active base of preparation; Captain Sampson, senior officer of the North Atlantic squadron, was appointed its commander-in-chief with rank of acting rearadmiral; and a " flying squadron " composed of the armoured cruiser " Brooklyn " (flag), the battleships "Texas" and "Massachusetts," and the fast cruisers " Minneapolis " and "Columbia," with Commodore W. S. Schley in command, was stationed at Hampton Roads.
There was a great preponderance of large ships on the side of the United States; only in torpedo craft and small gunboats was Spain superior. The American ships were highly efficient; in Spain everything was unready; Admiral Cervera felt that to send a Spanish squadron across the Atlantic was to send it to destruction, and when he had collected his squadron (including two cruisers from Havana) at the Cape Verde Islands in March, he renewed his expostulations, in which he was supported by a council of war. But on the 24th of April he was peremptorily ordered to leave for Puerto Rico, without definite instructions or plan of campaign.
The American flying squadron was held at Hampton Roads, so great was the fear of attack by Spanish ships; and armed auxiliaries and fast cruisers were employed in patrolling the coast east of New York; these could have rendered good service elsewhere, but would have been of no use in repelling an attack by Cervera 's squadron had it come that way.
The joint resolution of Congress of the 20th of April had declared that the relinquishment by Spain of authority in Cuba was the object of American action; the struggle thus naturally centred about the island. All operations were thus near at hand, Havana, the real objective in Cuba, being only about 100 m. from Key West. A political reason for confining action to the western Atlantic was that an immediate attack upon the coasts of Spain might have aroused the strongly pro-Spanish sympathy of continental Europe into greater activity. The regular United States army, the only available force until war was declared and a volunteer force was authorized, had been assembled at Tampa, Florida, New Orleans and Chickamauga, Georgia, but until the control of the sea was decided, the army could not prudently be moved across the Strait of Florida. Cervera's fleet was thus the real objective of the navy, and had to be settled with before any military action could be undertaken.
Rear- Admiral Sampson left Key West early on the 22nd, and began the blockade of Havana and the north coast of Cuba as far as Cardenas, 80 m. east, and Bahia Honda, 50 m. west. His North Atlantic squadron of 28 vessels of all kinds, of which the armoured cruiser " New York " (flag), the battleships " Iowa " and " Indiana," and the monitors " Puritan," " Terror " and " Amphitrite," were the most important, and which included six torpedo-boats, was increased to 124 vessels by the 1st of July, chiefly by the addition of extemporized cruisers, converted yachts, etc.
In the Pacific, the American squadron the protected cruisers "Olympia" (flagship of Commodore George Dewey), " Baltimore," " Raleigh " and " Boston," the small unprotected cruiser " Concord," the gunboat " Petrel," the armed revenue cutter " Hugh M'Culloch," with a purchased collier " Nanshan " and a purchased supply ship " Zafiro "left Hong-Kong at the request of the governor and went to Mirs Bay, some miles east on the Chinese coast. Ordered (April 25) to begin operations, particularly against the Spanish fleet, which he was directed to capture or destroy, Dewey left Mirs Bay on the 27th, and arrived off Luzon, in the Philippines, on the 30th of April. The Spanish admiral Montojo anchored to the eastward of the spit on which are the village and arsenal of Cavite, in a general east and west line, keeping his broadside to the northward. His force consisted of the " Reina Cristina," the " Castilla " (an old wooden steamer which had to be towed) ; the " Isla de Cuba " and "Isla de Luzon" (protected cruisers of 1050 tons); the "Don Juan de Austria" and the "Don Antonio de Ulloa " (gunboats of about 1150 tons), and the " Marques del Duero " (of 500 tons). There were six guns (3 breech-loaders) in battery at or near Cavite.
Dewey stood on during the night, and passed into the Boca Grande (about 5 m. broad), paying no attention to rumours of torpedoes in a channel so broad and deep, and at MaaUa." midnight passed El Fraile (a large rock, 13 m. from the south side), from which two shots were fired at him, and he was also fired at by the " Cavite " and one of the city batteries. When he sighted the Spanish squadron to the southward he ordered his transports and the revenue cutter " Hugh M'Culloch " out into the bay, and stood down in column with the " Olympia," " Baltimore," " Raleigh," " Petrel," " Concord " and " Boston " at 4oo-yd. intervals. When .within 5000 yds. he ported his helm, and at 5.41 a.m. opened fire. He stood westwards along the Spanish line, using his port batteries, turned to starboard and stood back, gradually decreasing his distance to 2000 yds. At 7 o'clock the Spanish flagship attempted to come out and engage at short range, but was driven back by the American fire. The Spanish squadron was now in very bad plight, but the seriousness of its condition was not fully known to the American commander. At 7.35 Dewey withdrew, gave his men breakfast, and had a consultation of commanding officers. Before he re-engaged at ii. 16 the " Cristina " and " Castilla " had broken into flames, so that the remainder of the action consisted in silencing the Cavite batteries and completing the destruction and demoralization of the smaller Spanish ships, which the " Petrel " was ordered in to burn. The victory was complete. All the Spanish ships 1 were sunk or destroyed. The injury done the American ships was practically nil. The Spanish lost 167 killed and 214 wounded, out of a total of 1875. The Americans had 7 slightly wounded out of 1748 men in action. Dewey took possession of Cavite, paroled its garrison, and awaited the arrival of a land force to capture Manila.
The blockade of Havana had progressed without incident, beyond the capture of a number of Spanish steamers and sailing vessels, 2 and the shelling of some new earthworks Blockade." at Matanzas on the 27th of April; but on the nth of May a small action was fought at Cardenas, in which the Americans were repulsed and Ensign Worth Bagley, the first American officer to lose his life in the war, was killed. On the same day a partially successful attempt was made, under a heavy fire from the shore, to cut the cable between Cienfuegos and Havana.
Cervera had left the Cape Verde Islands on the 20,th of April with four armoured cruisers, the " Almirante Oquendo," " Infanta Maria Theresa " and " Vizcaya " (sister ships of 7000 tons) and the " Cristobal Colon " (same size; differently equipped) and three torpedo-boat destroyers a type not then represented in the American navy" Furor," " Terror " and " Pluton." On hearing (May i) of Cervera's departure, Sampson went east 1000 m. to San Juan, Puerto Rico, with the armoured cruiser "New York," the battleships "Iowa" and "Indiana," the cruisers " Montgomery " and " Detroit," and one torpedo-boat. In going east he calculated on using a speed of 10 knots, on getting to San Juan on the 8th, about the time the Spaniards would reach 1 Three of the best were afterwards raised and repaired by American engineers.
The "Buenaventura," the first prize of the war, was taken by the gunboat " Nashville " off Key West on the 23rd of April.
its longitude, and if they were not there, on returning off Havana before they could get to Havana harbour. He wished to prevent Cervera's refitting at San Juan, from which place the American coast would be within easy reach, New York being only about 1400 m. away. But the speed of the American squadron fell short of Sampson's expectation; he reached San Juan on the 12th, stood in to see if Cervera was in the harbour, and opened fire upon the fortifications. He did not press the attack since Cervera was not present, and at once started back for Havana without news of Cervera, who was then in fact off Martinique, with orders to go to San Juan. When he heard that Sampson was at San Juan, he steamed to Curacao, where he arrived on the 14th of May and where the authorities allowed him to coal. He reached Santiago de Cuba early on the igth without being sighted en route by any of the American scouts, though several were in the vicinity. Sampson thought the Spanish squadron might have returned to Spain. 3 But he learned that the enemy had not turned back, on the night of the isth, when a telegram from the navy department directed him to proceed with all despatch to Key West. He got there on the afternoon of the 18th, and found the flying The Search squadron ("Brooklyn" (flag), " Massachusetts," for Cervera's " Texas," and " Scorpion "), which left on the next Squadron. morning (igth) for Cienfuegos, then regarded by the -navy department as the certain objective of the Spanish squadron. The battleship " Iowa," the gunboat " Castine," the torpedoboat " Dupont " and the collier " Merrimac " ' sailed to join Schley on the 20th, and gave him a force sufficient to meet Cervera. Sampson was advised by the department (on the 20th) to " send by the ' Iowa ' to Schley to proceed off Santiago de Cuba with his whole command, leaving one small vessel off Cienfuegos," but he directed Schley in an order of the 21st if he was satisfied that Cervera was not at Cienfuegos, to proceed with all despatch to Santiago, and if the Spanish squadron was there, to blockade it.
Commodore Schley arrived off Cienfuegos on the 22nd, and held to the opinion that Cervera was there until the 24th, when Commodore M'Calla of the " Marblehead " communicated with the insurgents some miles westwards, and learned the truth. Schley started that evening for Santiago, 300 m. distant, but on the afternoon of the 26th was 20 m. south of the port. Early on the 27th Schley received a despatch from the navy department suggesting that the Spanish squadron was in Santiago and bidding him see " that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action." Schley replied "... cannot remain off Santiago present state squadron coal account . . . much to be regretted cannot obey orders of department. . . forced to proceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan Passage "; in the controversy that arose out of these events Schley's critics insisted that the " Iowa " and the " Massachusetts " had at this time enough coal to carry them three times the distance from Santiago to Key West.
Sampson with the " New York " had arrived early on the 28th of May off Key West. When Schley's telegram, which had much disturbed the Washington officials, was forwarded to Sampson, he secured permission to go at once to Santiago with the " New York " and " Oregon " (which had arrived at Key West on the 26th of May in excellent condition after her voyage of nearly 16,000 m. from the Pacific) to turn back Schley's heavier ships. Before he started he received a telegram from Schley stating that he would remain off Santiago. It is now known from the documents published by Admiral Cervera that the Spanish squadron, in the interval preceding the ?8th, when Schley arrived in sight of the port, was on the point of leaving Santiago. On the morning of the 2Qth two Spanish cruisers were seen a short distance within the entrance, and on the 31st Schley, with the " Massachusetts," " Iowa " and " New Orleans," stood in and made an attack upon these and the batteries at long range (8500-11,000 yds.). On the 30th Sampson, leaving a squadron on the north side under Commodore Watson, stood for Santiago at a speed of 13 knots. He arrived early on the 1st of June and work was at once begun on the preparations for sinking the collier " Merrimac " in the entrance channel, which was less than 200 ft. broad in parts available for ships. The preparations for a quick sinking were chiefly carried out by naval constructor Richmond P. Hobson, who went in, in the early morning of the 3rd of June, with a crew of seven men. The steering-gear was disabled by a shell, and the ship drifted too far with the tide and was sunk in a broad part of the channel where it did not block the egress of Cervera's squadron. Cervera sent word to Sampson that Hobson and his men, who had been captured, were unhurt. They were exchanged on the 7th of July.
 A telegram (not received by Cervera) had been sent to Martinique on the 1zth of May, authorizing the squadron's return.
On the 6th of June the batteries at the entrance were bombarded and their weakness was ascertained. Sampson thereThe United u P on placed, every evening, a battleship (relieved states Fleet every two and a half hours) close in, with a searchbefore light turned on the channel, making it impossible, as Santiago, Cervera afterwards said, for the Spanish squadron to escape by night. The port of Guantanamo, 40 m. east of Santiago, was occupied by the " Marblehead " and " Yankee " on the 7th, a battalion of marines from the transport " Panther " landed there on the loth, and the port was used thereafter as a base-and coaling station. On the 14th the Spanish land forces retired before an expedition of the American marines, who remained in occupation until the 5th of August.
A blockade of San Juan, Puerto Rico, by one or two fast ships was kept up on account of the presence there of the destroyer " Terror," but this vessel, coming out (June 22) with a gunboat to attack the auxiliary cruiser " St Paul," suffered so severely that she could hardly return to port, and was thereafter unserviceable.
When war was declared the total military forces of the United States consisted of 27,822 regulars and 114,602 militia. An act of the 22nd of April had authorized the president to call upon the states and Territories for men in proportion to their population, the regimental and company officers to be named by the governors of the states, the general and staff officers by the president. A first call was made for 125,000 men, and a month later a second call for 75,000. On the 26th of April large additions to the regular army were sanctioned for the war. The quotas were filled with extraordinary rapidity, and in May 124,776 had volunteered. The troops were concentrated chiefly at Chickamauga, Georgia, at Camp Alger, Virginia, and at Tampa, Florida, Preparations which was selected as the point for the embarcation tor a Land o f tjj e expeditionary force for Cuba, and where Campaign. Major-General W. R. Shafter was in command. With the exception of unimportant small expeditions, everything was delayed until control of the sea was assured, though some thirty large steamers were held in readiness near Tampa. After the arrival of Cervera at Santiago, the blockade of his squadron and the request (June 7) of Admiral Sampson to send a land force for co-operation, the troops embarked on the 7th and 8th of June, but a start was not made until the 14th, owing to a false report that Spanish war-ships were in Nicholas Channel. On the 2pth the fleet of 32 transports, under convoy, arrived off Santiago. The whole force consisted of about 17,000 officers and men, 16 light field-guns, a train of heavier pieces, and some 200 vehicles. General Shafter selected Daiquiri, about 18 m. east of Santiago, for the point of landing, and the harbour entrance (preferred by Sampson) was disregarded. The fleet furnished all its available boats, and on the 22nd-25th the army was landed on a rough coast with scarcely any shelter from the sea; after the first day Siboney, 7 m. nearer Santiago, was used as well as Daiquiri. With the exception of three volunteer regiments (the 1st Volunteer Cavalry, known as the Rough Riders, of which Theodore Roosevelt was lieutenant-colonel; the 2nd Massachusetts and the 7 ist New York Volunteers), these troops were composed almost wholly of regulars, most of whom had served on the plains against the Indians. Soon afterwards more volunteers arrived.
No opposition was made to the landing and the small Spanish contingents at Daiquiri and Siboney were withdrawn without doing any damage to the equipment of the railway which ran from Santiago to the iron mines at these points. The American troops (commanded by Major-General Joseph Wheeler until the zgth, when General Shafter landed) pushed forward, a soon as they landed, and found a small Spanish rearguard which was covering the concentration of outlying detachments on Santiago and which was entrenched i\ m. beyond Siboney, at Las Guasimas. Brigadier-General S.B.M. Young with 964 dismounted cavalry engaged (June 24), and after a sharp action, in which he lost 16 killed and 52 wounded, drove back the enemy, of whom n were killed out of some 500 engaged. The advance was slow and a week elapsed before Shafter was ready to fight a battle in front of Santiago. Here the defenders, under General Arsenic Linares, held two positions, the hill of San Juan, barring the direct road to Santiago, and the village of El Caney, to the northward of the American position at El Pozo. The plan of attack on the ist of July was Shafter's, but owing to the illness of Shafter the actual command was exercised by the subordinate generals, Joseph Wheeler, H. W. Lawton and J. F. Kent. General Lawton's division was to attack and capture El Caney, and thence move against the flank and rear of the defenders of San Juan, which would then be attacked in front by Kent and Wheeler from El Pozo. But Lawton for nine hours was checked by the garrison of El Caney, in spite of his great superiority in numbers (4500 to 520); at 3 p.m. the final assault on El Caney was successfully delivered by General A. R. Chaffee's brigade. Only about 100 of the Spanish garrison escaped to Santiago; about 320 were killed or wounded, including General Vara del Rey, who, with a brother and two sons, was killed. In the meantime Wheeler and Kent had an equally stubborn contest opposite San Juan hill, where, in the absence of the assistance of Lawton, the battle soon became a purely frontal-fire fight, and the rifles of the firing line had to prepare the attack unaided. The strong position of the Spaniards, gallantly defended by about 700 men, held out until 12.30, when the whole line of the assailants suddenly advanced, without orders from or direction by superior authority, and carried the crest of the Spanish position. A notable part in the attack was taken by the 1st Volunteer Cavalry or " Rough Riders," commanded by Colonel Leonard Wood and Lieut.-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt. The Spaniards had no closed reserves, and their retreat was made under a devastating fire from the Americans on the captured hills. On the American side over 1500 men out of 15,000 engaged, including several of the senior officers, were killed or wounded; and in one of Kent's brigades three successive commanders were killed or wounded. On the Spanish side, out of the small numbers engaged, over 50% were out of action. Linares himself was severely wounded, and handed over the command to General Jose Toral. The Cubans on the American right failed to prevent General Escario from entering Santiago with reinforcements from the interior, and at the beginning of the investment General Toral's forces numbered about 10,000 men of the army and a naval contingent from the fleet.
Though victorious, the American army was in danger: after great fatigue under a tropical Sun by day, the time spared at night from digging trenches was spent on a rain- i aves tmeat soaked ground covered with thick vegetation; the of Santiago soldiers' blankets and heavy clothing had been cast on the Land aside in the attack; and there was insufficient food, Slde ' because it was difficult to haul supplies over the one poor road from the base of supplies at Siboney. There was even discussion of retiring to a point nearer Siboney. Brisk firing was continued on the 2nd and 3rd of July, with a considerable number of casualties to the Americans. On the morning of the 3rd a demand was sent to the Spanish commander to surrender, with the alternative of a bombardment of the city to begin on the 4th. This in effect had already begun on the ist, when Admiral Sampson fired a number of 8-in. shells fron^a point 3 m. east of the harbour entrance over the hills into the city, using a range of about 45 land miles. The result of this and the threat of General Shafter was an exodus of many thousands of civilians towards El Caney, where the American supplies were heavily taxed to support them.
On the morning of the 3rd of July Sampson, in his flagship the " New York," left the fleet to confer with General Shafter at Naval Siboney with regard to combined operations at the Battle of harbour entrance. 1 At 9.31, when he had gone about Santiago. 5 m., the "Maria Teresa" was seen coming out. The ships in front of the port were the yacht " Gloucester," the battleships " Indiana,"" Oregon," "Iowa," and "Texas," the armoured cruiser " Brooklyn " and yacht " Vixen," in the order named from east to west, making a semicircle about 8 m. in length. The " Massachusetts " and " Suwanee " were coaling at Guantanamo. The " Iowa " hoisted the signal " Enemy coming out." All at once stood in toward the Spanish ships, which were standing westwards along shore, and began a heavy fire. The " Maria Teresa " (flagship) was followed at 8oo-yd. intervals by the " Vizcaya," " Colon " and " Oquendo." They were firing vigorously, but most of their projectiles went far beyond the American ships. The " Brooklyn " (flag of Commodore Schley, the senior officer present) made a turn to starboard, which seems to have caused the " Texas " to stop and back, and to have given the " Colon " the opportunity of passing almost unscathed. The " Maria Teresa " and " Oquendo " had taken fire almost at once, and, as their water mains (outside the protective deck) were cut, they were unable to extinguish the flames: they were run ashore at 10.15 an d 10.20 respectively, about 6j m. west of Santiago, burning fiercely. The " Vizcaya " and " Colon " were still standing westwards. Cervera's destroyers, the " Pluton " and " Furor," had come out last, some distance behind the " Oquendo," and were received with a heavy fire from the " Indiana " and from the unarmoured " Gloucester," which engaged them at close quarters. They attempted to close, but were cut to pieces. The " New York," Sampson's flagship, had passed, and stood on signalling the " Iowa " and " Indiana " to go back and watch the port, lest an attack be made on the American transports. The torpedo-boat " Ericsson " was ordered to rescue the men from the two Spanish ships ashore, and the flagship, with all the others, stood on in pursuit of the " Vizcaya " and " Colon." The " Vizcaya " hauled down her colours off Aserraderos, 15 nautical miles west of Santiago, and was there run ashore burning about 11.15 a - m - The " Iowa " was ordered to stop and rescue her men. and the " Oregon," " Brooklyn " and " Texas " (and behind them the flagship) settled down to the chase of the " Colon," some 6 m. ahead of the nearest American ship. She was, however, slacking her speed, and at 12.40 the " Oregon " opened with her i3-in. guns at a range of 9000 yds., as did also the " Brooklyn," with her 8-in. When the " Oregon " had fired five shells, the " Colon " hauled down her colours, and was beached at the mouth of the Rio Turquino, where in spite of endeavours to recover her, she became a total wreck. The whole Spanish fleet was destroyed; Admiral Cervera was taken prisoner; Captain Villamil, commanding the torpedo flotilla, went down with his ship; and Captain Lazaga of the " Oquendo " was drowned. Over 500 Spaniards were killed or wounded, and the survivors (except a few who escaped to Santiago) were prisoners. On the American side only one man was killed and ten were wounded, and no ship received serious injury.
After the naval victory combined operations were arranged for attacking the batteries of the harbour, but little more fighting occurred, and eventually a preliminary agreement was signed on the 15th, and the besiegers entered Santiago on the 1 7th. In accordance with the terms of the capitulation, all the Spanish forces in the division of Santiago de Cuba surrendered and were conveyed to Spain. The total number amounted to about 23,500, of whom some 10,500 were in the city of Santiago. The exposure of the campaign had begun to tell in the sickness of the Americans: yellow fever had broken out to some extent; and no less that 50% were attacked by the milder forms of 1 Shafter had urged that the squadron should enter the harbour and take the city. Sampson (and the Navy department) was unwilling to risk losing a ship in the well-mined harbour and wanted the army to move on the forts and give the American squadron an opportunity to drag the harbour for mines.
malarial fever. The army, indeed, was so weakened by illness that the general officers united in urging its removal from Cuba. Major-General Nelson A. Miles, the general-in-chief , had arrived with reinforcements on the 12th of July, but the majority of these men were retained on board ship.
The fleet and the army gathered in Guantanamo Bay; and a new flying squadron, the " eastern squadron," was organized under Commodore John C. Watson, to proceed by way of the Mediterranean to the Philippines, threatening the Spanish coast, in order to meet a Spanish " reserve squadron," which had been formed towards the end of May, and which was to be sent on to the eastern coast of the United States, and thence to Cuba, but which was diverted toward the Philippines, and left Cadiz, on the 16th of June, for the East. This squadron turned back on the 8th of July after hearing the news of the Spanish defeat at Santiago.
On the 7th of May a telegram had been received from Dewey at Manila: " I control bay completely, and can take city at any time, but I have not sufficient men to hold." The cruiser " Charleston " and the steamer " Peking," with ammunition, supplies and troops, were sent to him at once. Major-General Wesley Merritt, to whom was assigned the command of the troops for the Philippines, first requested a force of 14,000, and afterwards asked for 20,000 men. On the 25th of May the first troops, 2491 in number, under Brigadier-General T. M. Anderson, sailed in three transports from San Francisco, touched at Honolulu, and were convoyed thence by the " Charleston." On the 20th of June possession was taken of the island of Guam, and on the 30th of June the ships arrived in Manila Bay. A second detachment of troops, 3586 in number, under Brigadier-General F. V. Greene arrived on the 17th of July; on the 25th of July General Merritt, who had been appointed governor-general, arrived; and on the 31st the five transports with which he had left San Francisco arrived with 4847 men, making nearly 11,000 men at Manila, with 5000 more on the way. General Merritt moved his forces from Cavite, and established an entrenched line within a thousand yards of the Spanish position at Manila, from which, on the night of the 31st of July, a heavy fire of musketry and artillery was opened, causing a loss to the Americans of 10 killed and 43 wounded, and for the next few days night-firing was frequent from the Spanish lines. On the 7th of August, a joint note from Dewey and Merritt, announcing that bombardment might begin at any time after , . , , , , ft 1. f ^1 Capture of forty-eight hours, and affording opportunity for the Manila removal of non-combatants, was sent to the Spanish captain-general, Fermin Jaudenes, who replied that he was surrounded by the insurgents, 2 and that there was no place of refuge for the sick and for the women and children. A second joint note demanding surrender was declined by the Spanish commander, who offered to refer it to Madrid. This was refused, and preparations were made for an attack. There were 13,000 troops within the city fortifications, but with the strong fleet in front, and with the beleaguering force of Americans and insurgents ashore, resistance was hopeless. When the combined assault of army and navy was made on the 13th there was no great resistance, and a white flag was hoisted at n o'clock, within one and a half hours after the fleet opened fire, a formal capitulation being signed the next day, the 14th of August. The total loss of the Americans during the whole campaign was 20 killed, 105 wounded.
Immediately after the surrender of Santiago (July 17), preparations were made for the invasion of Puerto Rico with 3500 troops which had been sent as reinforcements Operations to Santiago, but had not landed. They were largely I" Porto reinforced and left Guantanamo, under General Klco - Miles, on the 21st of July, convoyed by a strong squadron.
2 On the 19th of May, Emilio Aguinaldo, who had been at Hong Kong, had landed from one of the American vessels at Cavite, and on the 1st of July, when the American troops landed, had proclaimed himself president of the Philippine Republic. The political attitude which he assumed was not sanctioned by the American authorities. At the head of the insurgents he had instituted a close siege of Manila.
Fajardo, at the extreme north-eastern end of the island, was given out as the objective point of the expedition, but after sailing the plans were changed, and the towns on the south side were occupied, practically without resistance. The attitude of the population was exceedingly friendly, and opposition was not met until advance was begun northward. The troops were divided into four columns, advancing from Guanica around the western end of the island to Mayaguez: from Arroyo at the eastern end to meet the San Juan road at Cayey; from Ponce by the fine military road, 70 m., to San Juan; and the fourth column by way of Adjuntas and Utuado, midway of the island. The various movements involved several skirmishes, the chief opposition being met by the western column on the 1cth of August, and by the column from Ponce on the gih, when the Americans lost i killed and 2 2 wounded ; the Spanish, 126 killed and wounded, and over 200 prisoners. A further advance on the San Juan highway would probably have developed greater resistance, but news of the suspension of hostilities intervened. The total American loss had been 3 killed and 40 wounded. On the 12th of August operations were begun by the " Newark " and other vessels against Manzanillo. But during the night news arrived of the signing of the peace protocol on the 12th, and of an armistice, of which the Americans were informed by the Spanish commander under a flag of truce.
The total American loss was in the navy, i officer, 17 men killed; in the army, 29 officers, 440 men. The health of the American fleet was kept remarkably. Its average strength during the "4 days of hostilities was 26,102; the deaths from disease during this time were 56, or at the rate of 7 per 1000 per year. As nearly the whole of the service was in the tropics, and in the summer or wet season, this is a convincing proof of the efficiency in sanitary administration. The army did not fare so well, losing by disease during May, June, July and August, 67 officers and 1872 men out of an average total of 227,494. Its larger proportion of illness must of course be ascribed, in part, to its greater hardships. The war department was accused of gross maladministration; but the charges were not upheld by an investigating committee. The lack of proper preparation by the war department and the ignorance and thoughtlessness of the volunteers were the principal reasons for the high death-rate in the army.
For the terms of the peace and the results of the war see UNITED STATES; PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; CUBA; PORTO Rico.
The literature of the Spanish-American War is voluminous: amongst the principal sources of information may be mentioned; The annual reports of various departments for 1898, especially the War Notes of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, which include Spanish translations, and the appendix to the report of the Bureau of Navigation; R. H. Titherington, A History of the Spanish-American War (New York, 1900); H. C. Lodge, Story of the Spanish War (New York, 1899); H. W. Wilson, The Downfall of Spain (London, 1900) ; W. A. M. Goode, With Sampson through the War (London, 1899); J. Wheeler, Santiago Campaign ( Philadelphia, 1899); Theodore Roosevelt, The Rough Riders (New York, 1899); C. D. Sigsbee, Personal Narratives of the Battleship Maine (New York, 1899); R. A. Alger, Spanish-American War (New York, 1900); Gomez Nunez, La Guerra hispano-americana (Madrid, 1900); H. Kunz, Taktische Beispiele aus den Kriegen der Neuesten Zeit II. (Berlin, 1901); Admiral Pliiddemann, Der Krieg um Cuba 1898 (Berlin) ; John D. Long, The New American Navy (2. vols., New York, 1903) ; John R. Spears, Our Navy in the War with Spain (ibid., 1898); Bujac, Precis de quelques campagnes conteinporaines, IV. (Paris, 1899) ; and the Century and Scribner's magazines for 1898 and 1899 passim.
Note - this article incorporates content from Encyclopaedia Britannica, Eleventh Edition, (1910-1911)